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COMMENTS
A CONTRACT REMEDY FOR THE SLUM DWELLER
Javins v. First National Realty Corporation, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.)
cert, denied, - U.S. - (1970).
If the legislatures have not meant what they have said, let the courts
make them end the verbal mythology of decent housing; and if the
legislatures have meant what they have said, let [the courts] get busy and
implement their principles.'
Plaintiff-landlord, First National Realty Corporation, brought an
action for possession based upon nonpayment of rent in the Landlord
and Tenant Branch of the District of Columbia Court of General
Sessions. In defense,2 tenants offered to prove "approximately 1500
violations of the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia ' 3 in
the apartment building, all violations having arisen after creation of the
tenancy. The offer of proof was rejected, and judgment rendered for the
landlord. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that the landlord is under no contractual duty to maintain the premises
in compliance with the Housing Regulations, and any violations arising
after the tenancy is created are not a defense to an action for possession
based upon nonpayment of rent.'
On appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, held:
a warranty of habitability, measured by the standard set out in the
Housing Regulations for the District of Columbia, is implied by
operation of law in all leases of urban dwelling units covered by the
Regulations, and breach of such warranty gives rise to usual remedies
for breach of contract.5
I Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869, 921 (1967).
2 Rule 4(c) of the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Court of General Sessions provides:
In suits in this branch for recovery of possession of property in which the basis of recovery of
possession is nonpayment of rent, tenants may set up an equitable claim by way of
recoupment or set-off in an amount equal to the rent claim. No counterclaim may be filed
unless plaintiff asks for money judgment for rent. The exclusion of any claims in this branch
shall be without prejudice to the possession of any claims in other branches of the court.
WASH., D.C. CT. GEN. SESS. (LANDLORD AND TENANT) R. 4(c).
3. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
U.S. - (1970).
4 Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
5 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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Javins is the latest addition to the line of "remedial case law that is
now slowly being fashioned in the District of Columbia and
elsewhere-a case law that articulates new landlord responsibilities and
new limitations on landlord's rights." 6
The significance of Javins lies in two directions. First, it offers a new
and potentially powerful weapon to the slum tenant in his fight for
decent housing. Secondly, in so doing, property law is finally being
remolded to meet modern exigencies.
The decision has been prophesied7 as a natural outgrowth of the 1968
ruling in Brown v. Southall Realty Co." In Brown, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held that where the landlord entered into a
lease knowing of serious violations of the housing code, the lease was an
illegal contract, void and unenforceable, and thus a defense to an action
for rent. 9 The Brown opinion looked to the purpose behind the
6. Murphy, A Proposal for Reshaping the Urban Rental Agreement, 57 GEo. L.J. 464, 467
(1969).
7. See Levine, The Warranty of Habitability. 2 CONN. L. REV. 61, 66 (1969); Schoshinski,
Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 Gao. L.J. 519 (1966); 18 CATH. U.L.
REV. 80, 92 (1968); 56 GEO. L.J. 920, 931 (1968); 25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 335, 340-41 (1968).
8. 237 A.2d 834, affd on rehearing without opinion (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); an earlier unreported
case came to the same conclusion: Adams v. Lancaster, Small Cl. No. C-12912-67 (D.C. Ct. Gen.
Sess., Oct. 25, 1967); cf. Jones v. Sheetz, 242 A.2d 208 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
A case decided shortly after Brown by the same court clarified that if an owner of premises
actually knew or should have known about conditions which violated the housing code, the absence
of an official inspection had no effect on the finding of illegal contract. Diamond Housing Corp. v.
Robinson, 257 A.2d 492,494 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
9. See Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922); Hartman v. Lubar, 133 F.2d 44 (1942), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1942); cf. Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160 (1929). It has been suggested that even
though he participates in the illegal agreement, the tenant is not similarly barred from recovering
from the landlord rent paid during the time the premises contained housing code violations. See
Royall v. Yudelevit, 268 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (holding that a member of the class for whose
protection the statute was passed was not in pari delicto and thus should be allowed recovery);
Indian Lake Estates v. Ten Individual Defendants, 350 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 947 (1966); Rubin v. Douglas, 59 A.2d 690 (D.C. Ct. App. 1948); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS §§ 601, 604 (1932); 18 CATH. U.L. REV. 80 (1968); 56 GEo. L.J. 920 (1968). However,
the tenant may be liable for the reasonable value of the use of the property during his occupancy.
See Brown v. Southall Realty Co., No. 4199 (D.C. Ct. App., April 17, 1968) (order on rehearing);
cf. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961) (court found breach of an implied
warranty of habitability and returned to tenant pre-paid rent minus the reasonable value of the
premises for period of possession); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical
Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 n. 25 (1969); 66
MICH. L. REV. 1753 (1968). But see Strong v. District of Columbia, 12 D.C. (I Mackey)265 (1881)
(quantum meruit recovery on an illegal contract forbidden); 6 F. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1887
(rev. ed. 1938) (one who has given illegal consideration or performed in whole or in part illegal acts
stipulated for in a contract cannot recover reasonable compensation for what he has done).
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enactment of the housing code to determine the illegality of the lease.'0
The court concluded that "the Commissioners of the District of
Columbia, in promulgating these Housing Regulations, were
endeavoring to regulate the rental of housing in the District and to insure
for the prospective tenants that these rental units would be 'habitable'
and maintained as such."" While the Brown holding did not reach, and
could not reach under the theory of illegal contract, violations arising
after commencement of the lease, such violations also clearly frustrated
the policy of the code.
Three separate considerations bring the court to the conclusion that
the common law must acknowledge the landlord's obligation to keep his
premises in a habitable condition: (1) The old rule was based on certain
factual assumptions which are no longer true, (2) the consumer protec-
tion cases require that the old rule be abandoned in order to bring
residential landlord-tenant law into harmony with the principles on
which those cases rest, and (3) the nature of today's urban housing
market also dictates abandonment of the old rule.
12
From the sixteenth century onward, the lease was considered a
conveyance of land, to which any covenants were merely incidental and
thus independent of the other party's obligation to perform. 3 Remedy
for breach of covenant lay in a suit for damages. 4 Indeed, the ancient
lease was invariably a conveyance of land for agricultural purposes, and
both parties were willing to concede that the landlord had substantially
performed upon execution of the conveyance. 5 Accordingly, the lessor
10. Section 2304 of the District of Columbia Housing Regulations provides:
No persons shall rent or offer t6 rent any habitations or the furnishings thereof, unless such
habitation and its furnishings are in a clean, safe and sanitary condition, in repair, and free
from rodents and vermin.
Section 2501 states:
Every premises accommodating one or more habitations shall be maintained and kept in
repair so as to provide decent living accomodations for the occupants. This part of the Code
contemplates more than mere basic repairs and maintenance to keep out the elements; its
purpose is to include repairs and maintenance designed to make a premises or neighborhood
healthy and safe.
WASH., D.C, HOUSING REG. §§ 2304, 2501 (1955).
I1 237 A.2d at 837.
12. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
13. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 at 202 (A. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY]. This is in contrast, of course, to the dependency of covenants in a
contract, where breach by one party relieves the other from performance. 3A A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 686 (1960).
14. Mitchell v. Weiss, 26 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
15. Friedman, The Nature of a Lease in New York, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 165 (1947).
Vol. 1970: 4991
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was under no duty to render the premises in a habitable condition,'6 or to
repair. 17 Exceptions were created to both rules. The landlord had a duty
to repair if the premises were to be used for a public purpose, '8 or in some
cases, if he had retained control over a portion of the premises." And a
warranty of habitability was implied if furnished premises were let for a
short term, 2 or if the premises were to be constructed or altered by the
16. Hughes v. Westchester Corp., 77 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Lawler v. Capital City Life Ins.
Co., 68 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Fisher v. Lighthall, 15 D.C. (4 Mackey) 82 (1885); Slabe v.
Beyer, 149 A.2d 788 (D.C. Ct. App. 1959); Hariston v. Washington Housing Corp., 45 A.2d 287
(D.C. Ct. App. 1946); Briggs v. Pannaci, 106 N.J.L. 541, 150 A. 427 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930); I
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 at 267. The cases are collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1453
(1919); Annot., 13 A.L.R. 818 (1921); Annot., 29 A.L.R. 52 (1924); 34 A.L.R. 711 (1925). A
handful of states have imposed a warranty of habitability and duty to repair upon the landlord by
statute. See Lesar, Landlord & Tenant Reform. 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1279, 1286 & n. 43 (1960). In
enacting such a statute, the California legislature attached the following note of explanation:
This section changes the rule upon this subject to conform to that which, notwithstanding
steady judicial adherence for hundreds of years to the adverse doctrine, is generally believed
by the unprofessional public to be law, and upon which basis they almost always contract.
The very fact that there are repeated decisions to the contrary, down to the year eighteen
hundred and sixty-one shows that the public do not and cannot understand their justice, or
even realize their existence. So familiar a part of the law could not arise again and again for
adjudication were it not that the community at large revolt at every application of the rule.
POMEROY, CAL. CIV. CODE ANN., Explanatory Note to § 1941 at 514 (1901).
English law implies a warranty of habitability along with a duty to repair, however only in leases
of low-rent housing-that with an annual rent of Z 80 or less in London or Z 52 or less elsewhere.
English Housing Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 5b, § 6(l)(c) (1957). See Lesar, Landlord & Tenant Reform,
35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279, 1290 & n. 70 (1960).
17. Paratino v. Gildenhorn, 4 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1925); Kaufman v. Clark, 7 D.C. (Mackey) I(1869); Dunnington v. Thomas E. Jarrell Co., 96 A.2d 274 (D.C. Ct. App. 1953); 1 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 3.78 at 346. The cases are collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1453 (1919); Annot., 29
A.L.R. 52 (1924). The tenant may not commit waste, and therefore he is obligated to repair to the
extent necessary to preserve the property in substantially the same condition as at the beginning of
the lease, subject to ordinary depreciation. Newbold v. Brown, 44 N.J.L. 266 (1882); Chalmers v.
Smith, 152 Mass. 561, 26 N.E. 95 (1891); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78 at 347.
18. Junkerman v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N.Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190 (1915).
19. Claude v. Nash, 46 A.2d 542 (D.C. Ct. App. 1946); Aprile v. Colonial Trust Co., 118 Conn.
573, 173 A. 237 (1934); Murphy v. Illinois State Trust Co., 375 Ill. 310, 31 N.E.2d 305 (1941);
Lunde v. National Citizens Bank of Mankato, 213 Minn. 278, 6 N.W.2d 809 (1942); Reinagel v.
Walnuts Residence Co., 194 S.W.2d 229 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1946); Rowe v. Ayer & Williams,
Inc., 86 N.H. 127, 164 A. 761 (1933); Ward v. Broadway Marlboro Realty Corp., 137 Misc. 71,
241 N.Y.S. 472 (1930); Woods v. Forest Hill Cemetery, Inc., 183 Tenn. 413, 192 S.W.2d 987
(1946); Archibald v. Fidelity Title & Trust Co., 296 S.W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Andrews v.
McCutcheon, 17 Wash. 2d 340, 135 P.2d 459 (1943).
20. Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922); Horton v. Marston, 352 Mass. 322, 225
N.E.2d 311 (1967); Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942); Ingalls v. Hobbs,
156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892); Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931);
Morgenthau v. Ehrich, 77 Misc. 139, 136 N.Y.S. 140 (1912); Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693
(1843).
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landlord for a particular use, and the lessee was restricted to that use.2 1
In these two situations, it was reasoned, the lessee would not have an
adequate opportunity to inspect the premises himself.22 Apart from these
exceptions, the landlord had a duty to reveal all latent dangers of which
he was aware.?3
There was, however, one covenant to the ancient lease that was not
incidental. In accordance with the original concept of the lease as a
conveyance of land, the mere relation of landlord and tenant would
imply in every lease a covenant of quiet enjoyment.2 4 Eviction was a
defense to rent,?- as was partial eviction.26 It was fundamental to the
earliest lease that the farmer did not have to pay rent if his landlord took
away the farm. While the dependency of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
and the obligation to pay rent may be visualized as an exception to the
rule that the covenants to a lease are independent,27 in fact possession
was so central to the lease that all other covenants were insignificant in
comparison and therefore independent. Upon the "exception" was built
the doctrine of constructive eviction, 2 "designed to operate as though
there were a substantial breach of a material covenant in a bilateral
contract." 29 Constructive eviction required a substantial interference
21. Woolford v. Electric Appliances, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938); Hardman
Estate v. McNair, 61 Wash. 74, 111 P. 1059 (1910).
22. Lesar, Landlord & Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279, 1286 (1960).
23. Sunasack v. Morey, 196 I11. 562, 63 N.E. 1039 (1902); Moore v. Parker, 63 Kan. 52, 64 P.
975 (1901); Steefel v. Rothchild, 179 N.Y. 273, 72 N.E. 112 (1904); Perkins v. Marsh, 179 Wash.
362, 37 P.2d 689 (1934); see Lawler v. Capital City Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 438 (1933). For a recent
application of the rule see Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
24 Johansen v. Arizona Hotel, 37 Ariz. 166, 291 P. 1005 (1930); Cohen v. Hayden, 180 Iowa
232, 163 N.W. 238 (1917); Stewart v. Murphy, 95 Kan. 421, 148 P. 609 (1915); Winchester v.
O'Brien, 266 Mass. 33, 164 N.E. 807 (1929); York v. Steward, 21 Mont. 515, 55 P. 29 (1898); Fifth
Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917); Hanley v. Banks, 6 Okla. 79,51
P. 664 (1897); Northern Brewery Co. v. Princess Hotel, 78 Ore. 453, 153 P. 37 (1915); Hannon v.
Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 208 N.W. 255 (1926); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.47 at 271.
25. I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.52 at 284.
26. Id. See Gombo v. Martise, 41 Misc. 2d 475, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1964),
rev'dper curam, 44 Misc.2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1964).
27 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.50 at 278.
28. Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 Ill. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930);
Giddings v. Williams, 336 Ill. 482, 168 N.E. 514 (1929); Shindler v. Grove Hall Kosher
Delicatessen, Inc., 282 Mass. 32, 184 N.E. 673 (1933); Dolph v. Barry, 165 Mo. App. 659, 148 S.W.
196 (1912); Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1826); Thirteenth & Washington Sts.
Corp. v. Neslen, 123 Utah 70, 254 P.2d 847 (1953); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.51 at 279.
29. Lemle v. Breedon, 462 P.2d 470,475 (Hawaii 1969).
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with possession or enjoyment, 0 and that the tenant abandon the
premises within a reasonable time.31
A fortuitous = departure from the rule took place in a relatively small
group of cases concerned with commercial leases.? In establishing the
rights and obligations of parties to a commercial lease, a court will look
to the whole contract and the intention of the parties to determine
whether the covenants are "independent" or "dependent". 34
Land was at the heart of the sixteenth century lease. When land, as
consideration, gave way to "space" in a building, the doctrine of
constructive eviction provided equitable results for what amounted to, in
essence if not in fact, dispossession. But no longer are covenants to an
urban dwelling lease incidental. The modern landlord's obligations
consist not merely of delivery of land, or even of space, but rather of "a
well known package of goods and services-a package which includes
not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and
ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors,
proper sanitation, and proper maintenance."' '
30. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.51 at 282. See Northwestern Realty Co. v. Hardy, 160
Wis. 324, 151 N.W. 791 (1915).
31. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.51 at 282. The cases are collected in Annot., 75 A.L.R.
1114 (1931). Two New York City cases attempted to do away with the necessity of abandonment in
view of the local housing shortage. This, in effect, made rent and services dependent. Johnson v.
Pemberton, 197 Misc. 739, 97 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1950); Majen Realty Corp. v.
Glotzer, 61 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1946). Other courts achieved the same end by more
liberal application of the partial eviction doctrine. See Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate
Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 342, 298 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1969); cf. Robb v. Cinema Francais, Inc., 194 Misc.
987, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.), rev'd per curiam, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d
459 (1964). See also F. GRAD, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS 120 (Nat'l
Comm'n on Urban Problems, Research Report No. 14, 1968); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of
Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L.
REv. 225, 238-42 (1969); Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54
GEo. L.J. 519, 531 (1966).
32. The contrast between the rise of dependency of covenants in the law of commercial leases, as
opposed to residential leases, has been attributed to the greater complexity of the former, and to the
paucity of appellate level litigation, due to financial limitations, on behalf of the residential tenants
prior to the emergence of neighborhood legal services projects under the antipoverty program. See
Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two Approaches, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 670,
679 (1966).
33. Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 24 (1944); Medico-
Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 457 (1942); University Club
v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914); Siracusa v. Leloup, 28 S.2d 406 (La. App. 1946).
34. Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 419, 132 P.2d 457, 462
(1942).
35. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 at 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Having
conceptualized the landlord as a seller of goods and services, the principal case finds support for a
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss4/5
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The court in Javins in finding an implied warranty of habitability in
all leases for urban dwellings found support in a recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Hawaii. In Lemle v. Breedon3" the Supreme Court of
Hawaii stated, "Legal fictions and artificial exceptions to wooden rules
of property law aside, we hold that in the lease of a dwelling house...
there is an implied warranty of habitability and fitness for intended
use."'37 It was their view "that to search for gaps and exceptions in a
legal doctrine such as constructive eviction which exists only because of
the somnolence of the common law and the courts is to perpetuate
further judicial fictions where preferable alternatives exist. ' 38
The Javins opinion finds that the common law supports a warranty of
habitability in every urban dwelling lease, but that even if there were no
such support in the common law, the enactment of the Housing
Regulations imposed such a warranty in every lease within the
jurisdiction of the code.
A line of personal injury cases in the District of Columbia and
elsewhere 3' lend weighty support to the court in its alternative finding
that the housing code requires an implied warranty of habitability in the
leases of all housing under the code. In those cases, it was held that
warranty of habitability in the proliferation of implied warranties of fitness in the products liability
field. See Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion of Bazelon,
J.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 935 (1953).
36. 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969).
37. Id. at 474.
38. Id. at 475. In addition to Lemle, the opinion in the principal case looks to the Supreme Court
of New Jersey's recent decision in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
In that case the tenant vacated leased offices while the lease still had two years to run. The landlord
sued for the rent, and the tenant successfully contended at the trial level that she had been
constructively evicted because each rainstorm flooded her office. The appellate division reversed on
the ground that the interference was not "permanent". The supreme court reversed the appellate
division in a broad, three-pronged holding, stating:
[Wlhenever a tenant's right to vacate leased premises comes into existence because he is
deprived of their beneficial enjoyment and use on account of acts chargeable to the landlord,
it is immaterial whether the right is expressed in terms of breach of a covenant of quiet
enjoyment, or material failure of consideration, or material breach of an implied warranty
against latent defects.
Id at 461; 251 A.2d at 276-77. Note that in Reste. in contrast to Lemle, the court stayed within the
protection of the traditional exceptions.
39. Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968); National Bank of Washington v. Dixon,
301 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir.
1960); McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961); Ewing v. Balan, 168 Cal.
App. 2d 619, 336 P.2d 561 (1959); Saracino v. Capital Properties Associates, Inc., 50 N.J. Super.
81, 141 A.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (Ct. App. 1922); cf.
Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank v. 108 West 49th St. Corp., 255 App. Div. 570, 8 N.Y.S.2d 354
(1938). Contra, Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624, 169 A.2d 912 (1933).
Washington University Open Scholarship
506 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1970: 499
enactment of the Housing Regulations imposed a legislative standard of
due care upon the landlord, and breach of that duty was evidence of
negligence.4 ° In the leading case, Altz v. Leiberson,4" Justice Cardozo
said, "The command of the statute, directed, as it plainly is, against the
owner, has thus changed the ancient rule of no duty to maintain."4 If
the Housing Regulations import a duty of due care, breach of which
renders the landlord liable in an action in tort for any resulting injury,
then the Regulations may also logically impose a warranty of
habitability based upon the minimum standard of decent housing
required by law.43
At least one case has so held. In Pines v. Perssion," the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, basing its decision on the legislative intent and
public policy evidenced in the housing code, allowed the tenant to rescind
the lease and recover his deposit on the theory that the landlord had
breached his implied obligation to provide habitable premises.
The illegal contract theory employed in Brown v. Southall Realty
Company,45 is not applicable to Javins because the violations in Javins
arose after formation of the lease. But as the court realizes, the public
policy considerations inherent in that decision are also present when the
landlord performs his obligations illegally.4" "Courts often imply
relevant law into contracts to provide a remedy for any damage caused
by one party's illegal conduct. ' 47
40. Depending on the jurisdiction, a violation of the housing code may be negligence per se, or
merely evidence of negligence that may be taken into account by the jury. That the housing code is
irrelevant to the issue of landlord liability remains the majority view. See F. GRAD, LEGAL
REMEDIES FOR HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS 115 (Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems, Research
Report No. 14, 1968).
41. 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
42. 233 N.Y. at 18, 134 N.E. at 704.
43. It has been suggested that this conclusion follows from the concept implicit in Brown and
Adams that rights or duties imposed by statute or ordinance existing at the time a contract is made
are a part of it. 56 GEO. L.J. 920 (1968). Contra, Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588,
251 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1964); Rubinger v. Del Monte, 217 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1961); Kearse v. Spaulding,
406 Pa. 140, 176 A.2d 450 (1962). Home builders have been held to an implied warranty that the
completed house will conform to the local building code. Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538,
165 N.E.2d 286 (1960); Gutowski v. Crystal Homes, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 269, 167 N.E.2d 422
(1960).
44. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). The case could have been decided under an extension
of the "furnished house" exception, but the court chose to reject the common law rule in favor of
the implied warranty. Accord, Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967).
45. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
46. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071. 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See O'Rourke v.
Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 133 La. 955, 63 S. 480 (1913); cases collected in Annot., 110 A.L.R.
1048 (1937).
47. The first enactment of housing codes at the turn of the century evidenced an attempt to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss4/5
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It would seem clear that the Javins decision appropriately realigns
property law and the urban dwelling lease with modern realities.
Certainly, legal scholars have long pressed for change; the exceptions to
the rules of no warranty of habitability and the independency of
covenants have become shop-worn with judicial use; and the legislatures
on their part have responded to a felt need for remedial law.' 8 But apart
from the unrealities of ancient property law, underlying the court's
action is the view, as articulated by Judge Wright a little more than a
year before he wrote the opinion in Javins, that: "Though our most
pressing social, moral and political imperative is to free the urban poor
from their degradation, the courts continue to apply ancient legal
doctrines which merely compound their plight. '49
The opinion in Javins notes that "official enforcement of the housing
code has been far from effective. ' 5 While fines and imprisonment are
persuade landlords to furnish tenants with the minimal standards of decent housing. Subsequent
legislative contributions to code enforcement are various. The following groups are comprehensive,
but not exhaustive.
(I) Repair and deduct: If the landlord fails to repair, the tenant may do so and deduct the cost from
the rent due. CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 1942 (Deering 1960); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42-201,
42-202 (1947); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2694 (1952).
(2) Welfare agency rent withholding: If the building contains violations "dangerous, hazardous or
detrimental to life or health" the welfare department may retain the rent money until the violations
are corrected. N.Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW § 143-b (McKinney 1966) (Spiegal Law).
(3) Tenant withholding: As a defense to an action for rent, the tenant may prove violations in the
building. Once proven, he may pay rent into the court, from which escrow the landlord may finance
repairs. Having repaired, the landlord is allowed to pocket what remains of the back rent. MASS.
ANN LAWS ch. 239, § 8A (Supp. 1969); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 755 (McKinney Supp.
1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1700-1 (Purdon 1967).
(4) Rent strikes: One third.of the tenants upon petition to the court may maintain total rent
suspension if there exists in the building any condition "dangerous to life, health or safety." Rent is
paid into court; repairs may be made therefrom. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 11, § 127F (Supp. 1969);
N Y REAL PROP. ACTIONS §§ 770-82 (McKinney Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1700-1
(Purdon Supp. 1970).
(5) Receivership: The building may be placed under the control of a receiver who is authorized to
borrow money to make repairs. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW. § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
(6) The Michigan law: Recently enacted, it provides for an artillary of remedies, including personal
rights of action and contractual defenses for the tenant, a warranty of habitability and duty to
repair, injunction, repair by the municipality, receivership and rent withholding. MICH. COMP.
LAWs ANN. §§ 125.401-519, 554.139, 600.5634, .5637, .5646, .5670 (Supp. 1970). See F. GRAD.
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS (Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems, Research
Report No. 14, 1968); D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT, 655-687 (1963).
48 Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1969 (Magazine) at 108.
49. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 at 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
50. WASH., D.C., HOUSING REGULATIONS §§ 2104, 3303 (1955).
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specifically provided for enforcement of the code,5' these sanctions have
failed for various reasons.52
Javins extends a new legal remedy53 to the slum dweller and to
proponents of code enforcement. The tenant may demand specific
performance by the landlord of his obligations under the lease, and, until
he performs, the tenant is similarly under no obligation to pay rent. One
commentator labels this the "club of continued occupancy without rent
payments. '5 4 Another recent District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals decision will protect the tenants from landlord retaliation in the
exercise of their rights. 5
While Javins finds that the purposes and structure of the housing code
require that it be read into housing contracts, the court does not consider
the various ramifications of that decision. In considering the possible
ramifications, the question arises whether the legislature might have
been better suited to fashioning the remedy.
The Washington Planning and Housing Association has reported that
during the year 1965-66, 115,913 dwelling units were inspected, and of
these 114,060 were found to be not in compliance with the local housing
code. In addition, 10,425 cases of noncompliance uncovered by the
inspectors made the previous year had not been corrected by the end of
the previous year. 5 While, according to Javins, the tenant may not
51. The nature of a criminal prosecution does not adapt itself to efficient code enforcement. The
criminal court judges have tended to impose minimal fines, and as of 1965 no landlord had yet been
sent to jail for a housing code violation. P. WALD, LAW & POVERTY 1965 at 15 (1965). See F. GRAD,
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS 29-33 (Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems,
Research Report No. 14, 1968); HUD, OEO & DEPT. OF JUSTICE, TENANTS' RIGHrTS: LEGAL TOOLS
FOR BETrER HOUSING. REPORT ON A NAT'L CONFERENCE OF LEGAL RIGHTS OF TENANTS 20 (1969);
Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions & Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254
(1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1965).
52. Dunham, Private Enforcement of City Planning, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 463, 465
(1955).
53. Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519, 541-
42 (1966).
54. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-902, 45-904 (1967).
55. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The court found that it was the intent of
Congress in enacting the D.C. Housing Regulations that a landlord be prevented from evicting in
retaliation for a tenant's reporting of code infringement. The landlord is thus precluded from
regaining possession until he can rebut a tenant's prima facie showing of improper motive.
However, it has been suggested that the common law right of self-help, still recognized in the
District of Columbia in situations where the landlord is lawfully entitled to possession and where he
can make entry without the use of force, will operate to discourage tenant initiative. See 39 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 152, 162 (1970).
If so, the effectiveness of the remedy offered in Javins will lie in large-scale rent strikes.
56. Lieberman, Administrative Provision E of Housing Codes, in HOUSING CODE STANDARDS
100 (Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems, Research Report No. 19, 1969).
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successfully raise the defense of housing violations to an action for rent
unless the violations constitute a substantial breach, affect the tenant's
own apartment or common areas which the tenant uses, and are not
caused by the tenant's own wrongful action, it is reasonable to surmise
that a fair percentage of Washington's slum dwellers are presently
legally justified in refusing rent. The reply is, of course, that that is the
point: if that many people are subjected to the miseries of substandard
housing, then that many are entitled to remedy. But the more realistic
conclusion may be that that many people will be left not only without
standard housing, but without slum housing.5 7 The National
Commission on Urban Problems has reported ". . . that strict
enforcement on a mass basis would lead to mass abandonment of
properties by their owners and/or higher rents with resultant occupant
displacement." 58 With an abundance of housing, the low income
population can be absorbed elsewhere, and the vacant buidlings, most of
which will be tax delinquent, can be rehabilitated by the municipality.59
However, in most cities, including Washington, D.C., there are
shortages of low-income housing, and therefore the result of the
landlord's abandonment would only be overcrowding elsewhere, or, if
the tenants were permitted to remain intact, a form of public housing.60
The National Conference on Legal Rights of Tenants has said:
[Liegal reforms can have an impact only if they are accompanied by
57 Some statistics:
In 1966, average rent/month/room ranged from $22 in the South to $49.50 in the West.
Only 43. 1% of the gross possible income (GPI) from the large low rise apartments remained after
expenses to cover debt service, depreciation, and return on investment; elevator buildings-48.3%;
garden type apartments--49.5%.
Real estate taxes, up 9.2% since 1966, in 1966 took 15.7% of the GPI for elevator buildings, 16.6%
for low rise, 13.3% for garden.
As a percentage of GPI, payrolls range from 6.3% on the smaller low rise to 8.4% on elevator
buildings. Loss from vacancies and delinquent rents is in the area of 4% to 5%. Maintenance and
repairs account for 4.3% to 6.3% and management for 4.3% to 5.2%.
E. EAVES, How THE MANY COSTS OF HOUSING FIT TOGETHER 8 (Nat'l Comm'n on Urban
Problems, Research Report No. 16, 1969).
58. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 286 (1968). Sax
and Hiestand indicate that
[tIhxs is the paradox which has created the present slum housing dilemma. Landlords are
insulated from effective law enforcement in order to avert an intensification of the low-cost
housing shortage; yet this very insulation not only perpetrates the indecent conditions of the
slums, but also prevents the creation of the intense pressure needed for legislative action by
preserving the status quo in its more or less stable (albeit deplorable) condition.
Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869 (1967).
59. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 286 (1968).
60 HUD, OEO & DEPT. OF JUSTICE, TENANTS' RIGHTS: LEGAL TOOLS FOR BETTER HOUSING,
REPORT ON A NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LEGAL RIGHTS OF TENANTS 27 (1969).
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resourceful economic action. The economic gap is far too great to be
budged by law alone. Legal tools, even when strengthened and
refashioned, can only be an assisting force, and influence for greater
fairness. The root problems are primarily economic."
For this reason and others, the Conference found:
It was generally agreed that the legal reforms necessary to provide
tenants with effective rights must be brought about through legislation.
The extent of reforms needed is too sweeping, and many of them represent
too great a departure from established law, for case-by-case judicial
interpretation to achieve adequate results.62
The holding in Javins does not seek to take the place of such legislative
reform; it, in fact, can be viewed as laying the groundwork.
Professors Sax and Hiestand, in their advocation of a tort remedy to
combat slum housing, comment:
We are not out to reform the landlord (who, we agree, cannot afford to
provide standard housing for the poor); we seek to create a pressure
situation leading to additional legislative subsidization of low cost
housing. Dislocation of the present housing situation, which is
comfortable enough for the slum landlord, is the means for creating that
pressure."
As the court in Javins points out, it lies squarely within the judicial
function to reform old common law doctrines to reflect community
values and ethics.64 The court proceeds to do just that in finding a
warranty of habitability in every urban lease, and in finding that a lease
is a contract in all respects. If the landlord is financially able to bring his
property up to the housing code standard, remedies such as the one
offered by Javins will economically motivate him to do so. If he cannot,
in reforming the common law, the court may have left the legislature
with no choice but to come up with some economic answers posthaste.
61. Id. iv.
62. Id. 19.
63. Sax, Slumlordism as a Tort-A Brief Response, 66 MICH. L. REv. 465, 567 (1968).
64. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss4/5
